In practice, however, the decision whether or not to approve a particular GMO is not solely a scientific issue. By the same logic, one might take for granted that only GMOs that have been shown to have adverse effects on animal or human health or the environment will not receive approval. Thus, the decision to approve a particular GMO should be on the basis of scientific grounds. The opinion of the panel should form the scientific basis when member states provide other legitimate arguments and cast their votes in the Standing Committee for Food and Animal Health of the European Commission. The risk assessment is conducted and compiled by the applicant, and is evaluated by the GMO Panel of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Any party seeking approval for an edible GM crop must provide extensive scientific documentation that demonstrates that the food or feed derived thereof has no adverse effects on human and animal health or the environment, does not mislead the consumer, or does not differ from the food it is intended to replace to such an extent that its normal consumption would be nutritionally disadvantageous for the consumer. 1829/2003, governs GM crops intended for human food and animal feed. Within the European Union (EU), a common regulatory legal framework such as Regulation (EC) No. Europe stands out as being considerably more restrictive than countries in North and South America and parts of Asia, for example. Despite the fact that the Codex Alimentarius guidelines are globally endorsed, the authorization procedure for GMOs differs substantially between national jurisdictions. Risk assessment and risk analysis of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is governed by internationally accepted guidelines, developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission ( One leading principle is the concept of substantial equivalence, which stipulates that any new GM variety should be assessed for its safety by comparing it with an equivalent, conventionally bred variety that has an established history of safe use. In a report from 2010, the EC concluded that biotechnology is not per se riskier than conventional plant breeding technologies These include lost revenues for farmers, breeding companies and consumers, brain drain and lost technology innovations, reduced agricultural productivity and sustainability, foregone health benefits, especially reducing malnutrition, and many more realized or expected virtues of GM crops. Instead, we need to highlight the opportunities missed by not accepting GM crops. The whole seemingly endless discussion about purported risks of GM crops is akin to the famous Monty Python sketch in which John Cleese is trying to return a dead parrot to shopkeeper Michael Palin, who, despite the evidence, insists that the bird is well, alive and “pining for the fjords”. Twenty-five years of risk research on GM crops have established beyond reasonable doubt that biotechnology is not per se riskier than conventional plant breeding technologies. These disadvantages become increasingly relevant as the scientific arguments for the prevailing resistance to GM crops become weaker. The reason for this over-cautious approach is widespread public resistance to GM crops, caused and amplified by interested groups that are opposed to the technology and invest heavily into lobbying against it.Īs time has gone by, the evidence for negative impacts of genetically modified (GM) crops has become weakerĪgainst this background of political resistance, it is no surprise that the risks, costs and potential disadvantages of not growing GM crops have received little or no attention. However, the regulatory policies within the EU are still rigid enough to prevent most GM crops from leaving the confined laboratory setting should some candidate occasionally overcome the hurdles posed by these policies, the precautionary principle is invoked in order to ensure further delaying in its use in the field. As time has gone by, the evidence for negative impacts of genetically modified (GM) crops has become weaker. These policies were widely accepted at the time, as public concerns were, and still are, important. As a consequence, the explicit goal of these policies is to protect society and nature from an assumed hazard, or, if protection is not possible, at least to delay the implementation of the technology until scientific evidence shows it to be harmless. Ever since the Asilomar Conference on ‘Recombinant DNA' in February 1975, regulatory policies relating to recombinant DNA technology have focused on the idea that this technology implies threats to human health and the environment.

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